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Abstract. In this paper, we propose a brand new public key encryp-
tion scheme in the Lie group that is a non-abelian group. In particular,
we firstly investigate the intractability assumptions in the Lie group,
including the non-abelian factoring assumption and non-abelian insert-
ing assumption. After that, by using the FO technique, a CCA secure
public key encryption scheme in the Lie group is proposed. At last, we
present the security proof in the random oracle based on the non-abelian
inserting assumption.
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1 Introduction
Currently, most asymmetric cryptographic primitives are based on the perceived
intractable problems in number theory, such as the integer factorization prob-
lem and discrete logarithm problem. However, due to Shor’s and other quan-
tum algorithms [27, 25] for solving the integer factorization problem and discrete
logarithm problem, the known public key cryptosystems based on these two as-
sumptions would be broken, when quantum computers become practical. Recent
advances in quantum computers shows that the time is coming [24]. Therefore,
it is an imminent work to search for more complex mathematical platforms and
to design effective cryptographic schemes, which can resist against quantum at-
tacks.
To deal with the crisis of cryptography in quantum era, cryptographers has
began to pay more attention towards non-commutative cryptography based on
non-commutative algebraic structures. One of the outstanding properties of non-
commutative cryptography is that it can take the advantage of intractable prob-
lems in quantum computing, combinatorial group theory and computational
complexity theory to constructing cryptographic platforms. This extension has
a profound background and rich connotation. First, from the viewpoint of the
platforms, non-commutative cryptography extends the research territory of cryp-
tography. A large number of non-commutative algebraic structures are now wait-
ing to be explored for new public key cryptosystems. Second, due to the ability of
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resisting against quantum attacks, non-commutative cryptography is expected to
achieve a higher strength. It is well known that non-commutative algebraic struc-
tures can increase the hardness of some mathematical problems significantly. For
instance, we already know that how to design efficient quantum algorithms for
solving hidden subgroup problems in any abelian group, but we are still un-
able to construct efficient algorithms for dealing hidden subgroup problem in
non-abelian groups [26].
Most of cryptosystems in non-commutative cryptography are derived from
combinatorial group theory, but they are mainly theoretical or have certain limi-
tations in wider and general practice. This is perhaps due to the lack of appropri-
ate description of group elements and operations or the difficulty of implementing
cryptosystems in practical domains. The non-abelian group (Lie group) used in
this paper is quite simple with clear description of group elements and operations
and it is easy to implemented.
1.1 Our Motivations and Contributions
Lie groups have important applications in many branches of physics and mathe-
matics such as mathematical analysis, differential geometry, topology and quan-
tum mechanics. Lie theory originated from Lie’s idea that extends the Galois the-
ory for algebraic equations to the differential equations [6]. From its beginning,
Lie theory was inextricably linked with the developments of algebra, analysis
and geometry. As the important measure of algebraic properties of Lie groups,
Lie algebras play an indispensable tool while studying matrix Lie groups. On
the one hand, Lie algebras are simpler than Lie groups. On the other hand, the
Lie algebra of a matrix Lie group contains much information about that group.
In Lie theory, matrix Lie groups are important among the types of Lie groups
and have classical matrix forms with their Lie algebras. After exploring cryp-
tographic aspects of Lie theory, we extracted an interesting discovery: the ex-
ponential mapping between Lie groups and Lie algebras can be viewed as a
non-abelian analog of exponent operation in finite fields. While being different
from exponent operation in finite fields, the exponential mapping is the usual
power series of Lie algebras, and the image set is indeed Lie groups. Besides,
there are different intractable assumptions between them: exponent operation in
finite fields is based on DLP in finite fields; the exponential mapping is based on
solving root problem of high degree polynomial equation in one variate, which
can be viewed as a variant version on matrices. Currently, there are no direct
formulas to solve this problem rather than degrading the degree of the equa-
tion step by step. When the variant is matrix, the complexity increases rapidly.
Therefore, combing cryptographic aspects of the exponential mapping, we probe
some cryptographic applications based on Lie theory.
In this paper, we come up with a series of intractable assumptions based
on the exponential mapping in Lie theory, including the non-abelian factoring
assumption and non-abelian inserting assumption. Subsequently, we propose a
CCA secure public key encryption scheme by using the FO technique [5]. We
also give the security proof in the random oracle based on the new assumption.
1.2 Related Works
It is always the most important thing to study the underlying intractable hy-
pothesis of mathematical problems for cryptographic primitives. Regarding the
non-commutative cryptography, this kind of study started from 1980’s when
the difficult problems in group theory were applied into cryptography. In 1984,
Wagner et al.[30] designed a public key cryptosystem based on undecidable word
problem in groups and semigroups. In 2000, Ko et al. [10] developed braid group
cryptography based on the intractable assumption of conjugate search problem
in braid group. In 2004, Eick and Kahrobaei [4] devised a new cryptosystem
based on the polycyclic group. In 2005, Shpilrain and Ushakov [29] put forward
a new public key cryptosystem by using Thomsen group. Since 2011, Kahrobaei
et.al [12, 13, 11, 8, 23] devised several new key exchange schemes and public key
encryption schemes based on group ring matrix, corresponding intractable as-
sumptions are reported to be DLP and FP in group ring matrix, respectively.
Unfortunately, most of the above cryptographic schemes are not secure[23]
At the same time, a type of cryptosystems based on the intractable assump-
tion in non-abelian group—group factorization problem (GFP) has gradually
become a typical representative of non-commutative cryptography and achieved
rapid development in recent thirty years. The first work in this type of cryptosys-
tems is the symmetric cryptosystem—PGM based on a special factorization basis
in finite permutation groups—logarithmic signature (LS) proposed by Magliv-
eras in 1986[16]. The algebraic properties of PGM were studied more deeply in
[18–20, 3], algebraic properties of PGM were discussed in detail. In 2002, In 2002,
Magliveras et al. [22] put forward a trapdoor permutation function and two pub-
lic key cryptosystems MST1 and MST2 by employing LS in finite non-abelian
groups. In 2009, Magliveras et al. [14] devised a new public key cryptographic
system—MST3 based on random covers and LS in finite non-abelian groups.
Meanwhile, Magliveras et al. proposed a practical platform–Suzuki 2-group for
the first time [7] and devised MST cryptosystems into practice. However, some
of the weaknesses are found in MST series cryptosystems [15, 1, 31, 28]. In 2008,
Magliveras et al. [15] provided a comprehensive analysis of MST3 cryptosystem
and stated that transitive LS is not suitable for MST3 cryptosystem. In 2009,
Blackburn et al. [1] pointed out that amalgamated LS is also not a reasonable
choice for MST cryptosystems. In 2010, Vasco et al. [31] presented a more pro-
found analysis of MST3 and showed that the intractability assumption GFP
doesn’t always hold for random cover of group G. The authors also discussed
that MST3 cryptosystem cannot achieve one-wayness in chosen plaintext at-
tack model, let alone the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacks. Therefore, in 2010, Svaba et al. [28] constructed a more secure cryptosys-
tem eMST3 by employing a secret homomorphic map. Moreover, the authors
analyzed all of the published references about attacking MST cryptosystems and
developed a set of weak key test tool for eMST3 cryptosystem. It was claimed
that bad LSs can be replaced by employing presented tool. But until now, there
is no valid evidence showing that this method is reasonable and effective.
Though there are many non-commutative cryptosystems proposed till now,
none of them are proven secure against chosen ciphertext attacks.
1.3 Paper Organization
The remaining paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will review the
related results in Lie groups, and propose our new assumptions. In Section 3,
we present our CCA public key encryption in Lie groups with along its security
analysis and efficiency analysis. At last, we conclude the paper in Section 4.
2 Definitions
In this section, we will review the definitions related to Lie groups, and propose
the non-abelian discrete logarithm (NAF) problem and non-abelian inserting
(NAI) problem, as well as the hardness analysis. For clarity, we would like to
introduce the notations used in this paper.
Table 1. Notations used in this paper.
R set of real numbers
C set of complex numbers
Z set of integers
Mn(C) set of n× n complex matrices
GLn(C) set of all invertible n× n matrices with complex entries
p large prime number
Mn(p) set of n× n matrices with entries in Zp
GLn(p) set of all invertible n× n matrices with entries in Zp
exp natural logrithm
2.1 Matrix Exponential and One-Parameter Subgroup
In this section, we review several classical conclusions in Lie theory including
matrix exponential and one-parameter subgroup. Actually, we directly copy the
results from [6].
Definition 1 (Matrix Exponential). [6] Let X ∈Mn(C) be an n×n complex
matrix, then the matrix exponential of X is defined as the usual power series
expX =
∑
∞
m=0
Xm
m! . In case when X is a nilpotent matrix, exp
X =
∑ℓ
m=0
Xm
m! ,
where ℓ is the nilpotent index of X.
It is easy to see thatMn(C) along with the multiplication operation construct
a semigroup.
Proposition 1. [6] Let X and Y be arbitrary n × n matrices. Then, we have
the following:
1. exp0 = In.
2. expX is invertible and (expX)−1 = exp−X .
3. exp(α+β)X = expαX · expβX for all α and β in C.
4. If XY = Y X, then expX+Y = expX · expY = expY · expX .
Item 3 shows that for an arbitrary matrix X , the power series expX is an in-
vertible matrix and belongs to GLn(C). Item 4 describes that the commutativity
of expX and expY depends on the matrices X and Y .
Definition 2 (One-Parameter Subgroup). [6] A function F : R→ GLn(C)
is called a one-parameter subgroup of GLn(C) if
1. F is continuous;
2. F (0) = In;
3. F (t+ s) = F (t)F (s) for all t, s ∈ R.
Property 1. [6] If F is a one-parameter subgroup of GLn(C), then there exists a
unique n× n complex matrix X ∈Mn(C) such that
F (t) = exptX
In Lie theory, exptX is the exponential mapping from a Lie algebra X to
its Lie group. Meanwhile, when X is given, F (t) = exptX ∈ GLn(C) is an
injection and a one-way function. Specially, the injection property is implied
by Proposition 1 (items 1,2,3), and the one-wayness is due to the intractable
assumptions of solving high degree root problem of polynomial equation in one
variate [17, 21, 9].
2.2 Non-abelian Factoring Problem and Non-abelian Inserting
Problem
By using the results reviewed above, we can propose two hard problems: non-
abelian factoring (NAF) problem and non-abelian inserting (NAI) problem.
Definition 3 (Non-abelian Factoring(NAF) Problem ). Let M = Mn(p)
be a semigroup with respect to multiplication operation, and G = GLn(p) the gen-
eral linear group with respect to multiplication operation. Let R, T ∈ M (R 6= T )
be two random nilpotent matrices. The factoring problem with respect to G, R, T ,
denoted by NAFGexpR,expT , is to factor the given product exp
xR · expyT ∈ G into a
pair (expxR, expyT ) ∈ G2.
Now, let’s analyze the hardness of the NAF problem. Firstly, it is easy to see
that there are many forms for A = expxR · expyT . For instance, A = BC = B′C′.
Secondly, from Proposition 1, we get that the map (x, y) 7→ expxR · expyT is an
injection with respect to R and T . Hence, it is with probability 1/|G| ≈ 1/pn
2
at
most to find a specific pair (x, y) satisfing the maps x 7→ expxR, y 7→ expyT and
expxR · expyT simultaneously. Note that |G| < |M| = pn
2
and |G| ≈ |M| = pn
2
when p is large enough. As a result, we believe that the NAF problem is hard
when |G| is large.
Furthermore, if R and T are noncommutative, so from Proposition 1 (items
1, 2 and 3), we conclude that expxR and expyT are non-commutative. In this
paper, we always assume that R and T are non-commutative, n ≥ 5 and p is
large enough.
It is quite interesting that solving the problem that given exptX ∈ G and
X ∈ M to compute t does not help to solve the NAF problem. It is because that
once R 6= T , there does not exist any operation between expxR and expyT or
between expR and expT .
Definition 4 (Non-abelian Inserting (NAI) Problem). Let M =Mn(p) be
a semigroup with respect to multiplication operation, and G = GLn(p) the general
linear group with respect to multiplication operation. Let R, T ∈ M (R 6= T ) be
two random nilpotent matrices.The non-abelian inserting (NAI) problem with
respect to G, R, T , denoted by NAIGexpR,expT , is to recover exp
(a+c)R · exp(b+d)T
from the given random pair (expaR · expbT , expcR · expdT )∈ G2.
It is easy to see that if the NAF problem is easy, then the NAI problem can be
also solved. In particular, the adversary can use the solution of the NAF problem
to get expaR and expbT with input expaR · expbT . After that, the adversary can
obtain the NAI solution expaR · expcR · expdT · expbT .
Actually, due to the non-commutability, the best solution for the NAI prob-
lem is to split one item of the NAI input into two parts, and then combine all of
them together. It looks like one item of the NAI input is inserted into the other
item. Hence, the name is obtained.
3 Proposed Public Key Encryption Scheme in Lie Groups
In this section, we will propose a new public key encryption scheme in Lie groups
by using the FO technique [5]. In particular, our proposal is proven-secure against
chosen ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model assuming the inserting
problem is hard in the underlying Lie group.
3.1 Description of the Proposal
There exist three algorithms in our proposal: key pair generation algorithm
KeyGen, encryption algorithm Enc, and decryption algorithm Dec. The details
are as follows.
KeyGen(κ): It takes the security parameters κ1, κ2, κ3, as input, it outputs a
public key pk = (M,G, S, T,∆,H1, H2, H3), and the corresponding private
key sk = (expx·S , expy·T ). The key pair satisfies the following requirements.
– M =Mn(p) is a semigroup with respect to multiplication operations.
– G = GLn(p) is a non-abelian matrix Lie group with rank n(n ≥ 5).
– p is a large prime number with p = Θ(2κ1), and |G| = Θ(pn
2
) =
Θ(2n
2κ1).
– R, T ∈ M are two random nilpotent matrices, and ∆ = exps·S · expt·T ,
where s ∈ {0, 1}κ3 and t ∈ {0, 1}κ4 are random numbers.
– H1, H2, H3 are three cryptographically secure hash functions:H1 : {0, 1}
κ2+ℓ →
{0, 1}κ3+κ4 , H2 : G → {0, 1}
κ2, and H3 : {0, 1}
κ2 → {0, 1}ℓ, where ℓ is
the bit length of the message.
At last, s, t should be securely destroyed.
Enc(pk,m): It takes a public key pk = (M,G, S, T,∆,H1, H2, H3) and a mes-
sage m ∈ {0, 1}ℓ as input, it outputs the corresponding ciphertext C =
(C1, C2, C3) by doing the following steps.
– Choose randomly a number σ from {0, 1}κ2.
– Compute rs||rt = H1(σ||m).
– Compute C1 = H2(exp
rs·S ·∆ · exprt·T )⊕ σ.
– Compute C2 = exp
rs·S · exprt·T .
– Compute C3 = H3(σ)⊕m.
Dec(sk, C): It takes a private key sk = (exps·S , expt·T ) and a ciphertext C =
(C1, C2, C3) as input, it outputs the corresponding message as follows.
– Compute σ′ = C1 ⊕H2(exp
s·S ·C2 · exp
t·T ).
– Compute m′ = C3 ⊕H3(σ).
– Compute r′s||r
′
t = H1(σ
′||m′).
– Check whether both of C1 = H2(exp
r′
s
·S ·∆ · expr
′
t
·T ) ⊕ σ′ and C2 =
expr
′
s
·S · expr
′
t
·T hold. If they both hold, set m = m′; otherwise, set
m = ⊥.
– Output m.
Correctness of the Proposal. The correctness of the proposal can be easily ob-
tained by the following equalities.
exprs·S ·∆ · exprt·T
= exprs·S · expt·S · expt·T · exprt·T
= exps·S · exprt·S · exprt·T · expt·T
= exps·S ·C2 · exp
t·T
3.2 Security Analysis of the Proposal
By the techniques used in [5], we can prove that our proposal is secure against
the chosen chiphertext attacks in the random oracle model assuming that the
inserting problem in the Lie group is hard.
Theorem 1. The proposal is secure against the chosen chiphertext attacks in
the random oracle model based on the NAI assumption in the Lie group.
Proof. If there exists an adversary A can break the CCA security of the pro-
posal, then we can build another algorithm B solving the non-abelian insert-
ing problem in the Lie group. That is, given ∆1 = exp
s1·S · expt1·T ∈ G, ∆2 =
exps2·S · expt2·T ∈ G, and S, T ∈ M, it aims to output∆ = exp(s1+s2)·S · exp(t1+t2)·T .
The details are as follows.
Setup: B sets the public values S, T,∆ as S, T,∆1 = exp
s1·S · expt1·T , respec-
tively. Clearly, B has no idea about the corresponding private key sk =
(exps1·S , expt1·T ).
Phase 1: B builds the following oracles.
– Random Oracle OH1 : A sends σ||m ∈ {0, 1}
κ2+ℓ to this oracle, B firstly
searches whether (σ||m,α) exists in Table TH1 that is empty at the
beginning. If it exists, B returns α to A; otherwise, B chooses a random
number α from {0, 1}κ3+κ4 , records (σ||m,α) into Table TH1 , and sends
α to A.
– Random Oracle OH2 : A sends R ∈ G to this oracle, B firstly searches
whether (R, β) exists in Table TH2 that is empty at the beginning. If it
exists, B returns β to A; otherwise, B chooses a random number β from
{0, 1}κ2, records (R, β) into Table TH2 , and sends β to A.
– Random Oracle OH3 : A sends σ ∈ {0, 1}
κ2 to this oracle, B firstly
searches whether (σ, γ) exists in Table TH2 that is empty at the be-
ginning. If it exists, B returns γ to A; otherwise, B chooses a random
number γ from {0, 1}ℓ, records (σ, γ) into Table TH2 , and sends γ to A.
– Decryption OracleOdec:A sends a ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3) ∈ {0, 1}
κ2×
G× {0, 1}ℓ to this oracle, B firstly searches (σ,m, α, β, γ) in tables TH1 ,
TH2 and TH3 , where αs||αt = α = H1(σ||m), C1 = β ⊕ σ, C2 =
expαx·S · expαt·T , and C3 = γ ⊕ m. It it exists, B sends m to A; oth-
erwise, B sends ⊥ to A.
Challenge: A sends B two messages m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ with equal bit length. B
computes C∗ = (C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3 ) as follows.
– Choose random σ∗, β∗ from {0, 1}κ2, and compute C∗1 = σ
∗ ⊕ β∗.
– Set C∗2 = ∆2.
– Compute C∗3 = H3(σ) ⊕mb, where b is a random number from {0, 1}.
At last, B sends C∗ to A as the challenge ciphertext.
Phase 2: It is almost the same as Phase 1, except that A cannot directly send
C∗ to the decryption oracle Odec.
Guess: A outputs the guess b′ on b. B randomly chooses R from Table TH2 ,
and sets ∆ as R. If A can output a correct guess, then R is the right ∆ with
probability 1/qH2 at least, where qH2 is the maximum number of queries to
the random oracle OH2 by A.
Similar with the analysis in [5], we can conclude that our proposal is secure
against chosen ciphertext attacks based on the NAI assumption. ⊓⊔
3.3 Quantum Algorithm Attacks
Since the publication of Shor’s quantum algorithm for solving IFP and DLP [27],
many mathematicians devote into developing secure public key cryptosystems
based on non-abelian algebra. It is unclear that how to use Shors quantum
algorithm to break the intractability assumption of the NAIexpR,expT problem.
Recall that Shor’s algorithm [27] consists of two parts: a quantum algorithm
to solve the order-finding problem over Z∗n and a classical reduction of factoring
n to the problem of order finding. Now, let us show that even if a quantum
algorithm for solving the order-finding problem over a non-abelian group G is at
hand, at present we still have no reductions, either classical or quantum for un-
derlying problem. In fact, the exponential mapping is completely different from
exponential operation in finite fields. Moreover, since R and T are both nilpotent
matrices, there is no order of a nilpotent matrix. Hence, Shor’s algorithm cannot
work for this case.
On the other hand, in order to obtain the pair (expxR, expyT ), we have to
factorize expxR · expyT ∈ G. But until now, there is no efficient classical algo-
rithms or quantum algorithms for factoring a general matrix into two specific
matrices.
Consequently, our scheme is secure against known classical and quantum
algorithms.
3.4 Efficiency Analysis
In this section, we would like to analyze the efficiency of our proposal and how
to choose the security parameters. In particular, we have the followings.
1. Key generation algorithm requires two exponential mappings of two nilpo-
tent matrices S and T , and the core parameters of the public key (pk) and the
secret key (sk) are the triple (S, T, expsS · exptT ) and the pair (expsS , exptT ),
respectively. They are 3|pn
2
| and 2|pn
2
| bit length respectively. Here, we ig-
nore the part of the parameters to describe M,G, H1, H2, H3.
2. Encryption algorithm requires two exponential mappings to compute exprsS
and exprtT and additional three multiplications to get the final ciphertext.
Similarly, the cost for evaluating H1, H2 and H3 is ignored without loss of
generality. The bit length of one ciphertext is κ2 + |p
n2 |+ ℓ.
3. Decryption algorithm does not need any exponential mappings but only two
multiplications to get the message, while it needs two exponential mappings
and three multiplications to check the validity of the ciphertext. The cost of
evaluating hash functions are still ignored.
4. According the results in Section 2, the ranges of s, rs, t, rt could be extended
to Z. In order to easy implementation, we set the ranges as {0, 1}κ3 and
{0, 1}κ4 in the description of our proposal. On the other hand, κ3 and κ3
should be large enough to resist against the brute force attack. Recall the
analysis of the NAF problem, the hardness is related to |G| ≈ pn
2
. Hence,
κ1 = |p| and n should be large enough to make —G— large. At last, κ2
could be set as that in [5].
4 Conclusion
The invention of Shor’s quantum algorithm for solving integer factorization prob-
lem and discrete logarithm problem casts distrust on many public key cryptosys-
tems used today. This urges us to develop secure public key cryptosystems based
on variety platforms, such as non-abelian algebra. In this paper, we at first pre-
sented two new intractable assumptions by using the exponential mapping in Lie
group. Subsequently, we proposed a new public key encryption schemes based
on Lie groups and Lie algebras. Our proposals are proved to be CCA secure in
the random oracle model.
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